How Leniency Worked in the Biedronka No-Poach Case

One carrier involved in the Biedronka no-poach arrangement told Poland’s competition authority, UOKiK, how the arrangement worked. Its fine was reduced by 50%, to PLN 166,600.
 
Why did cooperation reduce the penalty without removing it altogether? The answer lies in when the carrier came forward and what UOKiK already knew.
 
Our initial analysis of the Biedronka decision explains the arrangement and its penalties. This article looks at leniency: how a participant in an unlawful agreement may avoid or reduce a fine by disclosing its involvement and cooperating with the authority.
 
What happened in this case?
 
In September 2026, UOKiK imposed fines totalling PLN 571,960,550 on Jeronimo Martins Polska, 29 transport companies and eight individuals. According to the authority, carriers serving Biedronka distribution centres agreed not to compete for drivers, while Jeronimo Martins Polska coordinated and enforced the arrangement. The decision is not final and may be appealed.
 
In its announcement of the decision, UOKiK identified one participating carrier, Międzynarodowy i Krajowy Przewóz Towarów Kazimierz Olszański, as a leniency applicant. The carrier provided information about how the arrangement operated. But it applied after proceedings had begun and after UOKiK had collected substantial evidence. It did not obtain full immunity. Its fine was reduced by 50%, to PLN 166,600.
 
That figure tells us what cooperation achieved in this case. It does not, on its own, tell us precisely what evidence the carrier supplied or mean that any business approaching UOKiK at the same stage would receive the same reduction. The authority assesses each application against the evidence it already holds and the conditions of the programme.
 
How does leniency work in Poland?
 
Under UOKiK’s leniency programme, a business involved in an anti-competitive agreement can disclose its participation, provide information and evidence, and cooperate with the authority. If it meets the applicable conditions, it may avoid a financial penalty or obtain a reduction. An eligible manager can also apply independently; a manager’s own application does not protect the business.
 
Cooperation alone does not guarantee immunity. UOKiK’s 2025 guidance explains that the information or evidence offered for immunity must meet specific conditions in light of what the authority already knows. To obtain a reduction, an applicant must provide evidence with significant added value compared with the material UOKiK already holds. The timing, value of the evidence and quality of cooperation also matter when the authority sets the reduction.
 
Immunity and a reduction have different consequences. A successful immunity applicant can avoid the financial penalty, although UOKiK may still establish that an infringement occurred. An applicant receiving a reduction remains subject to a fine, as the carrier did in the Biedronka case. Neither outcome follows simply from admitting involvement.
 
Who should consider this distinction?
 
A worker who encounters a blocked job move may report a concern without knowing the full arrangement. Our article from the worker’s perspective explains that route. Leniency addresses a different position: that of a business or eligible manager involved in the agreement who discloses their own participation.
 
For a business that discovers a possible recruitment restriction across its suppliers, several questions become urgent:
 

• Who took part in the discussions, and on whose behalf?
• What instructions were given and how were they put into practice?
• What correspondence and records exist?
• Has an authority already contacted anyone involved?

 
The answers matter both to the assessment of the conduct and to any potential leniency application. They may be spread across teams. As our supplier-network analysis explains, a restriction can pass through procurement, management and site operations without appearing as a single rule in a contract.
 
A business facing that situation should preserve relevant material and seek competition-law advice promptly. UOKiK’s guidance addresses the preservation of evidence from the point at which an applicant considers coming forward. A rushed internal response that loses records, or an assumption that an operational practice cannot be an agreement between businesses, may make the position harder to assess.
 
Leniency gives participants a reason to disclose arrangements that outsiders may struggle to detect. In the Biedronka case, cooperation produced a substantial reduction, but the carrier still faced a fine. What a participant can achieve depends on the evidence, the programme’s conditions and the stage the investigation has reached.
 
Woźniak Legal’s competition team advises on competition investigations and leniency applications. If a review of your supplier or recruitment practices raises a concern, early advice can help establish the facts and assess the available options.